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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
since the appellant has repudiated that confession. Indeed it has been held that
where the defendant is uncertain of his rights, and is faced with the power of
a court, that a confession under these circumstances would be too unreliable to
be admitted as evidence.
22
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT CONCERNING ERRONEOUSLY LABELED INDICTMENT
Due process requires that an indictment inform the defendant in a criminal
proceeding that he is charged with the substantial elements of a given crime.2 3
In determining the sufficiency of an indictment, it is the acts alleged which
constitute the crime charged, rather than the descriptive label which they are
given.24"An error in naming the crime in the accusatory clause of the indictment
will not in itself afford grounds for granting a motion to quash the indictment.21
In New York, as the result of People v. Englese,26 if a defendant pleads guilty
to such a mislabeled indictment he may be entitled, as a matter of right, to
withdraw his plea and go to trial on the merits.
Ordinarily, an application for permission to withdraw a plea of guilty prior
to judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.2 7 In People v.
Engese,2s the defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment erroneously labeling
as a felony acts which constituted no more than a misdemeanor. Five years
later, his motion to vacate the judgment was granted by the trial court.20 His
application for permission to withdraw the plea of guilty was denied, however,
and he was resentenced nunc pro tunc for the misdemeanor. The Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed, 30 but in a 4-3 decision the Court of Appeals reversed holding
that once it was determined that the defendant had pleaded to a felony charge,
it was an abuse of the court's discretion to deny him his fundamental right to
plead anew to the indictment considered as one charging a misdemeanor.
In this decision the Court affirms its position that permission to withdraw
a plea of guilty should be granted when the circumstances indicate that the plea
was not freely entered - whether induced by misunderstanding of the charges, 3'
mistake of all concerned, 32 or improper coercion by the court such as a promise
of a lighter sentence 3 3 This rule can only be applied to the instant case, how-
ever, by the dubious proposition that the defendant pleaded guilty because
he was charged with a felony. When considered in the context of the above
notice requirements for due process, it appears highly unlikely that the error in
22. Supra note 17.
23. Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314 (1948).
24. People v. Peckens, 153 N.Y. 576, 47 N.E. 883 (1897).
25. People v. Sullivan, 4 N.Y. Crim. 193 (1885).
26. 7 N.Y.2d 83, 195 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959).
27. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 337.
28. Supra note 26.
29. County Court, Queens County.
30. 8 A.D.2d 744, 187 N.Y.S.2d 681 (2d Dep't 1959).
31. People v. Gowasky, 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E. 737 (1927).
32. People v. Englese, supra note 26.
33. People v. Farina, 2 N.Y.2d 454, 161 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1952).
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labeling the indictment so misled the defendant that he was induced to plead
guilty to the acts described when he would otherwise have entered a plea of
not guilty had the misdemeanor been so labeled. In branding the trial court's
action in this instance an abuse of discretion, the Court has gone to unusual
lengths to affirm a right, the denial of which remains doubtful.
PROOF OF FALSE REPRESENTATIONS INADMISSIBLE UNLESS ALLEGED IN INDICT-
MENT.
Defendant's conviction for first degree grand larceny was reversed and a
new trial ordered by the Appellate Division on the ground that testimony con-
cerning false representations made by defendant was improperly admitted in
absence of an allegation in the indictment that defendant made use of any
false representations 3 4 The Court of Appeals, in People v. Palen unanimously
affirmed this result. 35
In 1942, Section 1290 of the Penal Law was passed thereby abolishing
"... the subtle and confusing distinctions that had previously differentiated the
various types of theft."36 Section 1290-a, however, required any false represen-
tations to be alleged if (and only if) the crime was "effected" thereby, that is, if
the crime was one that previously would have been prosecuted as "obtaining
money by false pretenses." Since this, in effect, continued the distinction between
obtaining money by false pretenses and the other forms of common law larceny
which the Legislature had sought to abolish, Section 1290-a was amended in
1950.37 This Section now provides that if ... defendant made use of any false
or fraudulent representation or pretense in the course of accomplishing, or in
aid of, or in facilitating the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the
trial unless the indictment or information alleges such a representation or pre-
tense. Thus, the pleading requirement is extended to any theft situation, not
merely those amounting to "obtaining money by false pretenses".
Testimony was introduced in the present case to show that the defendant
had represented to his victim that he had a balance in his bank account of
$6,000, when in truth it was only $2.50, and had pretended to make an arrange-
ment with the bank whereby the complainant could leave his Veterans Admini-
stration check with the bank for "safekeeping". Although the crime did not
amount to obtaining money by false pretenses at common law, the Court felt
these were false representations which defendant "made use of" in accomplish-
ing the theft. Since they were not alleged in the indictment, the Court held that
Section 1290-a required a reversal of the conviction. The decision is a judicial
confirmation of the plain language of the section, making clear that the applica-
34. People v. Palen, 7 A.D.2d 791, 181 N.Y.S.2d 9 (3d Dep't 1959).
35. 7 N.Y.2d 107, 195 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1959).
36. People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 216, 81 N.E.2d 817, 118 (1948).
37. See New York State Legislative Annual, 54-55 (1950); People v. Lobel, 298
N.Y. 243, 82 N.E2d 145 (1948).
